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 Eﬀects of exclusion on social preferences
Sven Fischer∗and Werner G¨ uth†
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In three party ultimatum games the proposer can ﬁrst decide whether to
exclude one responder, what increases the available pie. The experiments
control for intentionality of exclusion and veto power of the third party. We
do not ﬁnd evidence for indirect reciprocity of the remaining responder after
the exclusion of the other. Similarly, not excluding the second responder is
only insigniﬁcantly reciprocated by it. Overall, we ﬁnd little evidence that
intentional exclusion has substantial eﬀects on behavior.
Keywords: Exclusion, bargaining, ultimatum game, social preferences, ex-
periment
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1. Introduction
In many situations of human interaction, one of three or more parties may decide to
exclude another from a jointly proﬁtable endeavor. For example, two children may
decide to exclude a third from their play. Similarly, business partners who in the past
used to work together may decide to exclude some former partner(s). Assuming other
regarding concerns, a robust ﬁnding in experimental psychology and economics, the
decision to exclude a third party clearly should aﬀect behavior of the remaining ones. If,
on the other hand, despite strong incentives, a party is not excluded, this should matter
as well.
In labor relations, exclusion is an important aspect. Especially multinational ﬁrms
are frequently restructured and relocated what often renders part of the workforce re-
dundant. Consequently, wage negotiations with unions are frequently held behind the
backdrop of layoﬀs either in other parts of the corporation or of less organized parts of
the workforce within the same unit. Furthermore, such layoﬀs may occur at times when
the corporation overall makes huge proﬁts. Judging by statements voiced by labour
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unrelated parts of the workforce.
One example is the restructuring initiative of Deutsche Bank AG in early 2005.
Deutsche Bank planned to ﬁre about 6500 employees worldwide despite a rate of re-
turn on equity1 of 16.2% in the same year (see Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 2005 and
Deutsche Bank Aktiengesellschaft 2006). Although Deutsche Bank’s net labor force was
reduced much less and increased again in 2006, ﬁgures show that proﬁtability increased
to 19.5% in 2006 (see Deutsche Bank Aktiengesellschaft 2007).
Several representatives of the German public, especially unions, reacted with outrage
to the downsizing decision by Deutsche Bank. But how does it actually aﬀect employer–
employee relations when, for the sake of proﬁtability, part of the labor force is dismissed?
International justice research (see, for example, Kahneman et al., 1986) established that
layoﬀs are seen as unfair if they are not economically necessary to prevent bankruptcy
(see, for example, Charness and Levine, 2000; Gerlach et al., 2006). Surveys also indicate
that part of the remaining workforce reacts with conﬂict-seeking behavior, sick leaves,
and even sabotage. In the context of the Deutsche Bank example this raises the question
how behavior of the (remaining) workforce is aﬀected by downsizing (threats).
In a set of experiments we explore how the decision to exclude a third party (or
not to exclude despite its proﬁtability) aﬀects behavior. By modifying the three person
ultimatum game we allow for exclusion of one party by the proposer. Exclusion increases
the total available pie and renders it proﬁtable. To control for intentionality of exclusion,
we contrast this (baseline) game with treatments in which a random draw excludes the
third party with a probability equal to the observed frequency in the baseline treatment.
We, furthermore, vary veto power in case of no exclusion: in one set of experiments
there are two responders with veto power, in a second set only the party that cannot
be excluded can veto. Furthermore, we contrast behavior to results from a standard
ultimatum game with equivalent parameters.
Of course, the ultimatum game does not mimic a particular real world interaction.
It is rather a workhorse allowing us to measures individual reactions and preferences of
responders who are not troubled by strategic uncertainty.
While in one experiment there are reactions to exclusion, they are rather mild and
diﬃcult to interpret. Overall we ﬁnd no evidence for indirect reciprocity in the sense
that the remaining responder tries to punish the proposer after excluding the third
party. Quite to the contrary, the proposer has little to fear from excluding a responder.
Still, if the third party is not excluded, the other responder reveals consideration for the
third party’s payoﬀ by rejecting 0-oﬀers for the third party. If, on the other hand, the
proposer decides not to exclude, he only gains little. While the party, which he could
have excluded, lowers its acceptance threshold, this eﬀect is only small and insigniﬁcant.
In a related study G¨ uth and Paul (2011) capture the downsizing example more realis-
tically by a “one-principal and two-agents”-framework where the principal could get rid
of the less productive agent. Treatments diﬀered in the proﬁtability of downsizing as well
1We are, of course, aware of the fact that this high rentability is partly due to the low equity ratio in
the banking industry.
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result is that downsizing does not depend on its proﬁtability and that the employee, who
cannot be ﬁred, does not react much to the threat or fact of downsizing. This seems to
conﬁrm our ﬁnding that there is little solidarity in the labor force what questions some
of the arguments used by trade unionists when trying to discourage downsizing attempts
of employers.
More generally, downsizing is a form of ostracism (see, for instance Masclet, 2003;
Cinyabuguma et al., 2005; Kerr et al., 2009; Maier-Rigaud et al., 2010). What is, however
special is that ostracism is usually seen as a form of punishing norm deviators whereas
downsizing is just an attempt to improve a ﬁrm’s proﬁtability and not at all a sanctioning
of underperforming agents. The exclusion of innocent parties from payments is, however,
also true for experimental studies where one party dictatorially decides whether or not
another party keeps or obtains its payment (see, for example, Brennan et al., 2008). Here
the major ﬁnding is that, in spite of some other regarding concerns, most participants
are very much self-centered in that they are bothered by own risk or delay but hardly
ever by similar complexities of other’s payoﬀs.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: We ﬁrst introduce and discuss the
model in section 2 and derive behavioral hypotheses in section 3. Section 4 describes the
experimental procedure. The experimental ﬁndings are reported in section 5. Section 6
concludes.
2. The Model
We analyse behavior in a modiﬁed three party ultimatum game with one proposer X
and two responders Y and Z. The game tree of treatment XV 2, our baseline treatment,
is plotted in Figure 1. In the ﬁrst stage the proposer decides whether to exclude Z what
reduces him to a base payment of u. After (not) excluding Z the proposer plays an
ultimatum game with the remaining responder(s) where the available “pie”, a divisible
monetary amount, is p > 0 in case of not ﬁring Z and rp with r > 1 in case of ﬁring Z:2
proposer X ﬁrst chooses how much to oﬀer the remaining responder(s). Here y (z) with
y + z ≤ p or y ≤ rp indicates her oﬀer to Y (Z, if applicable) about which Y and (if
applicable) Z are then informed about. The proposer is not conﬁned to identical oﬀers
to both responders when Z is not excluded. If Z is excluded, only Y decides whether
to accept or reject the oﬀer y. With respect to veto power in the subgame after keep,
we compare two diﬀerent treatments. In the baseline treatments V2 of Figure 1, both
Y and Z can veto the oﬀer (y,z), in treatments V1 only Y can veto. Thus, we vary the
degree of involvement of Z from a mere dummy in V 1 to a strategically involved party
in V 2.
Clearly, this one-shot bargaining model cannot fully capture real world bargaining.
However, it provides an easily understood scenario and allows to elicit acceptance thresh-
olds of responders free of any strategic considerations.3 Our 2 × 2 factorial design has
2Because of r > 1 and u ≪ p/3, ﬁring increases the total available pie but leaves Z much less than an
equal share of p.
3Game theoretically this means to experimentally implement the normal form of games as far as respon-
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the following two dimensions: (no) intentionality of the decision to exclude Z and (no)
veto power of Z. Intentional ﬁring (or keeping) may aﬀect responder behavior. We are
especially interested in how responders react to the intentional decision to exclude or
keep Z. In all X ⋆⋆ treatments the decision to exclude Z was made by a subject in role
X. In R ⋆ ⋆ treatments this choice by X was replaced by a random draw excluding Z
with a commonly known probability equal to the observed frequency in the equivalent
X ⋆ ⋆ treatment.
In treatments XV 2 and RV 2 both responders are endowed with veto power in the
subgame after keep. So we can measure Z’s reaction to not being excluded. However,
if Z has veto power, then not excluding him results in greater strategic uncertainty of
the proposer. Thus, excluding Z may be more acceptable for Y in V 2 which is why we
introduced treatments V 1. An overview of the four main treatments is given in Table 1.
Although there exist ample data on ultimatum behavior, we also ran a control treat-
ment CON as a simple two person ultimatum game with the same procedure and
der behavior is concerned. For proposers we do not use the strategy method to avoid counterfactual
considerations of proposer X (like having to choose y only in spite of playing keep and (y,z) in spite
of exclude).
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veto power
Y & Z Y only
intentionality
X decides XV 2 XV 1
random draw RV 2 RV 1
parametrization as in the subgame after exclude. By comparing Y ’s acceptance thresh-
olds in the subgame after exclude in XV 2 and XV 1 with the acceptance thresholds in
CON, we can directly measure eﬀects of exclusion.
3. Benchmark solutions and behavioral hypotheses
We now turn to a brief game theoretic analysis of our games which, however, can hardly
inform us about how subjects actually behave. Like most bargaining games, our con-
tinuous game has inﬁnitely many equilibria of which only one is sequentially rational
(Selten, 1975; Kreps and Wilson, 1982). As a ﬁrst benchmark solution, we consider
perfect equilibria assuming opportunistic agents who are rational and know that others
are rational, too. A selﬁsh and rational responder accepts any oﬀer yielding at least
his conﬂict payoﬀ. As r > 1 the proposer will exclude Z what allows him to distribute
rp > p between himself and Y . Thus, the only perfect equilibrium is that X excludes
Z and oﬀers minimal amounts to Y alone or Y and Z (in keep), and responders accept
any (positive) oﬀer.
In standard ultimatum games4 oﬀers below one third (and sometimes even higher
ones) are frequently rejected and signiﬁcant oﬀers are made with the modal oﬀer usually
being 50% of the available pie. It has been widely argued that this behavior reﬂects
equity preferences.5 Existing studies on three party ultimatum game behavior focus on
versions of the game where only one responder has veto power. The third subject, the
so-called dummy, usually receives small amounts and responders with veto power are
willing to accept very small oﬀers to Z.6 We are not aware of a three person ultimatum
experiment with two responders independently exercising veto power.
But what about behavioral models? With respect to our main research question, we
turn our attention to reciprocity although in a rich model like ours its likely eﬀects
are far from obvious. Actually, the ambiguity and ﬂexibility of reciprocity concerns
in our scenario may question rather than support the way how reciprocity theory has
4For a summary see, for example, Camerer (2003) or Holt (2007).
5For a discussion see, for example, Charness and Rabin (2002).
6Kagel and Wolfe (2001) ﬁnd that acceptance only mildly and non-monotonically reacts to the size
of the oﬀer to the third party. This, however, may be due to the random veto power in their
experimental design creating ex ante procedural equality among the receivers. G¨ uth and van Damme
(1998) however ﬁnd that oﬀers to Z crucially depend on whether Y is informed about them (see also
G¨ uth et al., 2007).
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actions are evaluated as “kind” or “unkind” and reciprocated accordingly.7 Besides such
direct reciprocity one also observes indirect reciprocal behavior. Here a reciprocal act is
directed towards a party in response to a “kind” or “unkind” act of this party towards
a third one.8 Stanca (2009) gives a good overview of experimental results on indirect
reciprocity. Using the same deﬁnitions, we argue that strong indirect social and strong
direct reciprocity is inﬂuencing decisions in our games. In our one shot experiments
reciprocity can only be “strong” according to Stanca’s deﬁnition as it can only be due to
intrinsic motivation and not because of long run strategic considerations like reputation
building as in repeated interactions.
Acceptance thresholds in the “exclude subgame”
Let us ﬁrst look at responder Y ’s behavior in the “exclude subgame” as inﬂuenced
by indirect reciprocity due to X’s exclusion of Z. The only way of sanctioning X is
by demanding more of the available pie, i.e., risking conﬂict. But what about direct
reciprocity? Excluding Z leaves more of the pie for both X and Y and, thus, can be
judged kind towards Y . However, this reasoning is incomplete. Suppose Y actually
interprets exclusion of Z as kind towards himself. He could reciprocate by conceding
more to X if exclusion was intentional rather than random. However, this contradicts the
interpretation of the intentions behind the exclusion: the reciprocal act would leave X
better oﬀ than in the absence of reciprocity, thus rendering the exclusion of Z a selﬁsh act
by X. Due to this ambiguity of reciprocity concerns, whether an oﬀer in subgame exclude
is kind or unkind may not depend on whether the decision to exclude Z came from X or
nature. In our view, if we compare Y ’s acceptance thresholds between treatments XV 1
and RV 1, the eﬀect of indirect reciprocity is more obvious, what explains our
Hypothesis 1 Responder Y reacts to X’s intentional exclusion of Z with a larger ac-
ceptance threshold in treatment XV 1 than in RV 1.
With respect to ⋆V2 treatments,another complication has been pointed out by one of
our anonymous referees. We mainly considered ⋆V 2 treatments to measure Z’s reactions.
However, Z’s veto power introduces additional strategic uncertainty that is eliminated
if Z is excluded. Excluding Z may, thus, be judged a kind act towards Y - an act
that is kind irrespective of the later oﬀer. Contrary to our previous argument, exclusion
of Z can therefore bee interpreted to be ’kind’ (or ’good’ or ’reasonable’) what Y can
reciprocate by conceding more to X. Thus, responder Y would directly reciprocate X’s
decision to keep or exclude Z in treatment XV 2 but not in treatments XV 1. In case of
the random exclusion in RV 2, however, there is no room for reciprocity:
Hypothesis 2 Acceptance thresholds of responder Y in subgame exclude are smaller in
XV 2 than in XV 1 and RV 2.
7See, for example, Rabin (1993) for normal form games and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) for
extensive games.
8See, for example, Seinen and Schram (2006) or Greiner and Levati (2005)
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treatments RV 2 and RV 2 is pretty identical as far as reciprocity is concerned:
Hypothesis 3 Responder Y ’s acceptance thresholds are the same in CON and in the
exclude subgames of treatments RV 2 and RV 1.
Acceptance thresholds in the keep subgame
Let us now turn to the subgame after keep where Z’s behavior may reﬂect direct reci-
procity. Clearly, keeping Z is kind towards him. Not only because he is likely to receive
more but also because it gives him veto power in XV 2 which in itself may be valuable.
Obviously, this act can only be kind and not driven by selﬁshness of X. Direct reci-
procity, thus, predicts that if the decision to keep Z is intentional, Z reciprocates by
accepting less:
Hypothesis 4 Acceptance thresholds of Z players are smaller in XV 2 than in RV 2.
But what about Y ’s threshold. Indirect reciprocity predicts that Y will be more
willing to accept lower oﬀers if the decision to keep Z is intentional. At the same time
keep may be bad news for Y himself. Still, the decision to keep Z can only be driven by
the desire to leave Z with more than u and, thus, can not really be interpreted unkind
towards Y .
Hypothesis 5 In subgame keep, responders Y accept lower oﬀers to themselves in treat-
ment XV 1 than in RV 1.
Again, in the ⋆V 2 treatments the strategic uncertainty associated with Z’s veto power
may induce diﬀerent reciprocal reactions:
Hypothesis 6 Acceptance thresholds of responder Y in the keep subgame are higher in
XV 2 than in XV 1, whereas in treatments RV 2 and RV 1 they do not diﬀer.
Inequality Aversion
Inequality aversion argues that people do not only care about their own payoﬀ but
also how it compares to those of others (see, for example, Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000;
Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). Unfortunately, equity preferences can neither account for
intentions, as measured with our comparison of X vs. R treatments, nor for diﬀerences
in veto power. They ﬁrst and foremost predict that inequality averse proposers will be
less inclined to exclude Z and that responders’ thresholds are likely to be positive and
sensitive to how (un)equal the oﬀered payoﬀs are. Exact predictions crucially depend
on the formalization and the distribution of inequality aversion in the population.9
9For the exact parameterization of our experiment one can easily apply the Fehr and Schmidt (1999)
model to our experimental game, using the distribution of aversion parameters suggested by them as
“consistent with the large experimental evidence we have on the ultimatum game” (Fehr and Schmidt,
1999, , p. 843). See , however, Fehr and Schmidt (2010); Binmore and Shaked (2010).
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payoﬀ (and how his own compares to it) his acceptance threshold is smaller than in
CON. (See the formal derivation based on F&S in A).
Hypothesis 7 Acceptance thresholds of responder Y in subgame exclude are smaller
than those in CON.
Note that this hypothesis contradicts hypothesis 3.
Veto Power
Finally we take a closer look at potential behavioral eﬀects of changes in veto power. If
Z has veto power, Y does not need to ’speak’ for Z:
Hypothesis 8 Acceptance behaviour of Y in the keep subgame reﬂects more concern
for Z’s payoﬀs in treatments XV 1 and RV 1 than in XV 2 and RV 2.
4. Experimental Design
We ran the ﬁve diﬀerent treatment conditions in a between subjects design, i.e. each
subject participated in only one treatment. In the random treatments RV 1 and RV 2 the
probability of being ﬁred was 85 and 67.5%, respectively. In order to obtain suﬃcient in-
formation from responders, we employed the strategy method.10 By using the positional
order protocol, we nevertheless tried to guarantee a “hot” decision environment that we
strengthened by informing responders that the proposer had just made her decision(s).
In more detail, treatment XV 2 proceeded as follows:
1. X decides whether to ‘keep’ or ‘exclude’ responder Z.
2. X decides how much she oﬀers to her remaining responders11 where the set of
possible oﬀers depends on her ﬁrst decision. Following ‘keep’ she can choose among
(y,z) ∈ {0,2,4,6,8}2 for Y and Z, and after ‘exclude’ she can choose among
y ∈ {0,2,4,6,8,10,12}. The monetary pie is set to p = 18 and r = 10/9, thus,
rp = 20.
3. Both Y and Z are informed that “X has already decided whether to exclude Z”
and that “X has already submitted her wage oﬀer(s). However, you will not be
informed about her decisions before the end of this round.”12
• Y is then asked to state for every possible oﬀer y (for the case that Z is
excluded) and combination of (y,z) oﬀers (for the case that Z is not excluded)
whether he would accept or reject it.
10In play method we would not obtain enough data points for many - often unreached - histories even at
considerably higher costs. In some treatments, for example, proposers decided to keep Z in less than
15% of the cases. Also note that, for example, Oxoby and McLeish (2004) ﬁnd no diﬀerence between
strategy and play method in Ultimatum games. Also, see the survey by Brandts and Charness (2011).
11Note again, that we do not use the strategy method for proposers to avoid counterfactual considera-
tions.
12A translation of the instructions and the original version in German are available upon request.
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cluded.
4. Decisions are matched and all players are informed about all relevant decisions and
all resulting payoﬀs. In case Z is excluded, he obtains u = 1.
Treatments ⋆V 1 diﬀered from ⋆V 2 only in subgame keep where Z had no veto power.13
Finally, in treatments RV 2 and RV 1 the decision to exclude was made by a random draw
with known probability equal to the excluding frequency in XV 1 and XV 2, respectively.
We limited the sets of possible oﬀers to ﬁve and seven values, respectively to reduce
the length of the strategy, the responders have to submit. The chosen sets include
the possibility for equal oﬀers (i.e., (6,6,6) and (10,10)) to render unequal oﬀers less
acceptable.14 Furthermore, the sets include oﬀers giving more to the responder(s) than
to the proposer. While such oﬀers are rare, they are nevertheless possible and should be
included (see, for example, G¨ uth et al., 2007, for rejections of too generous oﬀers).
With respect to our hypothesis 7, we need to check wether despite the reduced strategy
set we are likely to observe the predicted diﬀerences. In appendix A.2 we use widely
adopted parameters of the F&S model15 and apply F&S preferences to our experiment.
Results indicate that we are likely to observe higher thresholds of responder Y in CON
than in subgame exclude.
With respect to inequality aversion we are also interested to check, whether with our
parametrization we are likely to observe concerns for others who receive less. More
speciﬁcally, will we observe cases where Y rejects an oﬀer because it leaves considerably
less for X - or similarly, because it oﬀers too little to Z? When applying the same F&S
model version to subgame keep (see, appendix A.2) one predicts:
Hypothesis 9 Acceptance of oﬀers by responder Y in subgame keep reﬂects concern
for Z but not for X.
To see whether experience inﬂuences behavior, subjects were rematched in a perfect
stranger design and played the same game once again in the same role.16 Only one
randomly drawn round was paid, where points earned in that period were converted to
e at 1 point = e1.50.
Instructions relied on a neutral frame. The instructions, for example, did not use
the term ”exclude”. Instead subjects were informed that “[f]irst, X decides whether Z
should have power of decision, i.e., whether the round should already end for Z.”
To make sure that subjects understood the instructions, and to create common knowl-
edge about it, we invited an excess number of subjects and asked all to answer a set
of control questions. Subjects making mistakes were excluded from participation. All
subjects received e3 for answering the control questions, no additional show up fee was
paid.
13To keep Z participants busy we asked them a hypothetical question.
14Falk et al. (2000) ﬁnd that the set of alternatives has crucial inﬂuence on behavior. An unequal split
is less acceptable if the proposer had the option to oﬀer an equal one.
15See, however, the discussion in Binmore and Shaked (2010) and Fehr and Schmidt (2010).
16Thus no one interacted with someone twice.
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treatments 60 subjects participated, and in treatment CON a total of 38. For the ﬁrst
round we, thus, have 20 independent group observations per treatment in XV 1, RV 1,
XV 2 and RV 2.
5. Results
Including admission and payment, sessions of treatments XV 2 and RV 2 lasted for about
45 minutes, those of CON for about 30 minutes. Average earnings in all treatments
except for CON were e12.13 for X, e8.88 for Y , and e4.48 for Z (including the e3 fee).
Throughout the following analysis, signiﬁcance levels will be set to α = 10%. In XV 2
(XV 1), proposers in 85% (67.5%) of all cases excluded Z. According to Fisher exact
tests, ﬁring frequencies neither diﬀered signiﬁcantly between repetitions17 within each
treatment nor between treatments.18
5.1. The exclude subgame
We ﬁrst take a look at responder acceptance thresholds in the exclude subgame and in
treatment CON which are shown, combined over the two repetitions, in the histograms
of ﬁgure 2. We tested for repetition eﬀects by comparing distributions of acceptance
thresholds between repetitions within each treatment. Wilcoxon signed rank tests19 do
not ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences.20 Due to the discreteness and skewness of the data, ques-
tioning the applicability of the Wilcoxon rank sum test, we furthermore tested whether
frequencies of discrete thresholds diﬀer between repetitions using the Fisher exact test,
what could also be rejected. The following comparisons between treatments therefore
rely on pooled data.
Table 2 reports the results of Wilcoxon rank sum tests21 (above diagonal), and Fisher
exact tests22 (below diagonal) comparing two treatments at a time, as well as some
descriptive statistics (last columns to the right). All comparisons were also made by
Kolmogorove Smirnov and t-tests, whose results are qualitatively similar to the reported
ones. Acceptance thresholds are generally considerably higher in the two random treat-
ments RV 1 and RV 2, and with respect to XV 1 they are even signiﬁcantly larger. With
hypothesis 1 in mind we summarize:
Observation 1 Y ’s acceptance thresholds in the exclude subgame are larger in random
treatments than in treatments where the oﬀer is made by the proposer. This eﬀect is
signiﬁcant for XV 1 and RV 1 data.
17With p = .6614 in XV 2 and p = .5006 in XV 1.
18With p = .1136 for the comparison between XV 2 and XV 1 with data combined over both repetitions.
19The test corrected for ties, using the shift-algorithm by Streitberg and R¨ ohmel (1984).
20Wilcoxon signed rank tests comparing acceptance thresholds between the ﬁrst and second repetition
in treatments XV 2, RV 2, XV 1, and RV 1 with p=.7728, .2031, .9930, and 1.0000, respectively.
21Distribution of averages over periods per subject.
22We use the frequencies of choices over both rounds, thus treating the two observations of one subject
as independent.
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Observation 2 Though insigniﬁcant, Y ’s threshold after Z was excluded is larger in
XV 2 than in XV 1 but does not diﬀer between RV 2 and RV 1.
Note that, except for equality between RV 2 and RV 1, both observations reject our
hypotheses, even contradicting their direction. However, Hypothesis 3 is conﬁrmed:
Observation 3 Acceptance thresholds of responders Y in the exclude subgame of RV 1
and RV 2 do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly from those in CON. Furthermore, they do not diﬀer
signiﬁcantly in size from CON in XV 1 and XV 2.
Note that this contradicts our hypothesis 7 derived from inequality aversion.
Looking at distributions in ﬁgure 2 there is a striking diﬀerence. The distribution of
thresholds in XV 2 is bimodal what is reﬂected in signiﬁcant diﬀerences in distributions
according to the Fisher exact test (see Table 2). Ansari-Bradeley tests conﬁrm that
the dispersion of thresholds in treatment XV 2 is signiﬁcantly larger than in any other
treatment.23 No other treatment comparison ﬁnds signiﬁcant diﬀerences in dispersion.
Observation 4 Acceptance thresholds of responders Y in subgame exclude are more
dispersed in XV 2 than in any other treatment. More speciﬁcally, in XV 2 the distribution
is bimodal.
Table 2: Comparisons of Y ’s acceptance thresholds after exclude between treatments
Treatment
Treatment XV 2 RV 2 XV 1 RV 1 CON Median Mean Var

















RV 2 .0001 – .0385 .3840 .1222 6 5.00 4.10
XV 1 .0003 .0008 – .0333 .2731 4 3.80 6.32
RV 1 .0149 .1274 .0626 – .1010 6 5.30 6.27
CON .0016 .5799 .1343 .1919 – 4 4.21 5.36
Fisher exact test
Note: Reported values (other than median, mean and variance) are p-values: Below
diagonal from Fisher exact tests; above diagonal from Wilcoxon rank sum tests.
Considering the diﬀerences we ﬁnd in acceptance thresholds, is this also reﬂected in
oﬀers? Figure 3 shows the distribution of oﬀers after exclusion of Y and in treatment
CON.24 Distributions for treatments XV 2 and RV 2 are almost identical, and com-
paring all treatments, medians are always identical and means diﬀer only slightly. This
23Comparison with treatments XV 2 (p = 8.8e − 6), XV 1 (p = .025), RV 1 (p = .007), and CON
(p = .004). Qualitatively, the same statements hold when comparing only data from the ﬁrst or
second round.
24Again we could not ﬁnd diﬀerences between the ﬁrst and second period.
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Figure 2: Thresholds Responder Y after exclude and in CON
observation is conﬁrmed by Fisher exact tests and Wilcoxon rank sum tests that do not
ﬁnd any signiﬁcant diﬀerences.
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Figure 3: Oﬀers to Y after exclude and in CON
Observation 5 Proposer oﬀers to responder Y after exclude do neither diﬀer between
treatments, nor with respect to oﬀers in the control treatment CON.
5.2. The keep subgame
We now turn to responder behavior in the keep subgame, where we ﬁrst look at responder
Z in treatments XV 2 and RV 2. Ignoring for now the oﬀer to Y , we analyze the smallest
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Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 053oﬀer to Z he is willing to accept. The boxplot of ﬁgure 4 shows the distribution of these
acceptance thresholds separately for each treatment. The median in XV2 is smaller
than in RV2, what supports our hypothesis 4. However, again, diﬀerences are not
signiﬁcant - neither in location (Wilcoxon rank sum test: p = .658), nor in distribution
(Fisher: p = .4709).25 We also ran a panel probit estimation of Z’s acceptance of oﬀers
depending on the own oﬀer, the oﬀer to Y (other), and two dummies: DR indicating the
random treatment and DP2 for period 2 data, and relevant interaction eﬀects. We report
the marginal eﬀects26 of the estimation results and their bootstrap standard errors (in
parentheses) in the ﬁrst column (H4) of Table 3.27 While DR has a positive marginal
eﬀect on acceptance, it remains insigniﬁcant.
Observation 6 The smallest oﬀer responder Z is willing to accept does not diﬀer be-
tween XV 2 and RV 2
How does Y react to the intentional decision not to exclude Z? The boxplots in ﬁgure
4(b) show the distributions of the smallest accepted oﬀer to himself (ignoring the oﬀer
to Z). The plots indicate signiﬁcant diﬀerences. Indeed, Wilcoxon rank sum test (and
t-tests), ﬁnd that the lowest accepted oﬀers in XV 1 (XV 2) are signiﬁcantly smaller
than in RV 1 (RV 2).28 This result is conﬁrmed by model H5 of our Probit estimations
in Table 3. Intentionality of the decision to keep Z, signiﬁcantly (p = 0.068) increases
the probability that Y accepts an oﬀer by 12.66% points what conﬁrms29 our hypothesis
5.
Observation 7 Y ’s acceptance thresholds are signiﬁcantly smaller in subgame keep of
treatment XV 1 than RV 1.
Does veto power of Z in the V 2 treatments aﬀect reciprocity of responder Y ? Models
H6a and H6b in table 3 relate to this hypothesis 6. Both, ﬁgure 4 and estimation H6a
and H6b show:
Observation 8 Acceptance thresholds of responder Y in the keep subgame are insignif-
icantly smaller in XV 2 than in XV 1. In line with our hypothesis, however, they do not
diﬀer signiﬁcantly between RV 2 and RV 1.
Does refusing veto power to Z increase Y ’s consideration for Z’s payoﬀ (Hypothesis 8)?
The estimation H8 in Table 3 used data from all treatments except control CON. The
results show that with every additional payoﬀ for Z, the probability of acceptance by Y
increases by 1.88% points averaged over all treatments. In treatments where Z has veto
power, this insigniﬁcantly increases by 0.15% to 2.03%, contradicting our hypothesis.
25As there are no diﬀerences between periods we, again, combined data from both rounds.
26The interaction eﬀects makes it impossible to draw meaningful conclusions from regression coeﬃcients.
27We also ran estimations interacting DP2 with other regressors. As results did not diﬀer, we report
the results of the scarcer and, thus, more eﬃcient models.
28As there were no diﬀerences between period 1 and period 2 data we combined the data by taking the
average for each subject. The respective p − values are .0777 and 0.0389.
29In a similar regression, with only 1.33% points the same diﬀerence between XV 2 and RV 2 turns out
to be insigniﬁcant.
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Model: H4 H5 H6a H6b H6
Treatments: XV 2 XV 1 XV 1 RV 1 X ⋆ ⋆
& RV 2 & RV 1 & XV 2 & RV 2 & R ⋆ ⋆
Role: Z Y
(Intercept) 0.0017 0.0027 0.0021 0.0002 0.0028
(.0155) (.0139) (.0214) (.0004) (.0071)
DR 0.0353 -0.1266*
(0.0790) (.0695)
DV2 -0.0414 0.0716 0.0152
(.0597) (.0516) (.0437)
own 0.0724*** 0.0554 0.0917 0.0356* 0.0723***
(.0261) (.0445) (.0569) (.0183) (.0166)
other 0.0166** 0.0179*** 0.0184*** 0.0194*** 0.0188***
(.0074) (.0046) (.0045) (.0054) (.0031)
DP2 0.0224 -0.0080 0.0162 0.0084 0.0123
(.0446) (.0127) (.0267) (.0132) (.0120)
Dran:own 0.0477 -0.0602
(0.0483) (.0845)




DV2:other 0.0113 -0.0072 0.0015
(.0086) (.0112) (.0068)
N(Obs); N(Subj) 2000; 40 2000; 40 2000; 40 2000; 40 4000; 80
logL; σ2
RE -548; 1.45 -458;3.27 -505; 2.93 -473; 1.52 -437; 1.59
Note: Panel Probit estimations with random eﬀect per subject. Reported values are the average
marginal eﬀects in the sample. Standard errors (in parentheses) are the empirical distribution errors
from 50 panel bootstrap estimations. Variables: DR dummy for treatments with random draw, DV2:
Dummy for veto power of Z, own own payoﬀ, i.e. either y or z, other: oﬀer to other responder, DP2
dummy for period 2 decisions. Signiﬁcance: ***p ≤ .01, **p ≤ .05, *p ≤ .10 . The eﬀect reported as
(Intercept) is the probability of acceptance of an oﬀer of (0,0) in an X ∗ ∗ treatment in period 1.
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Figure 4: Lowest Accepted Oﬀers in keep subgame
Note: Notches give an approximate 95% conﬁdence interval for the median. Due to the skewness of
the distributions, some notches reach outside hinges.
Observation 9 Concern for Z, exhibited by Y , does not depend on whether Z has veto
power or not.
5.3. Inequality Aversion in keep
Suppose responders are not only concerned about their own payoﬀ but also compare it
to those of others. We test for the presence of such preferences in responder Y with
a simple Probit estimation (see column 1 in table 4) of acceptance on his own payoﬀ
(own), the absolute diﬀerence to the average payoﬀ in case Y receives less (disadv), and
15
Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 053Table 4: Probit: Inequality Aversion of Y
1 2 3
Subgame(s): exclude & fire keep
(Intercept) -1.4399*** -0.4728** -2.5022***
(.2396) (0.2264) (.2067)














DP2 0.0978 0.0971 0.1057
(0.0677) (.0671) (.0697)
N(Obs.); N(Subj.) 5120; 80 5120; 80 4000; 80
logL; σ2
RE -1166; 2.57 -1178; 2.37 -916.4; 2.48
Note: Panel Probit estimations with random eﬀect per subject on data from XV 1, RV 1, XV 2, and
RV 2, Subject Y decisions only. Variables: own: oﬀer to Y , disadv: diﬀerence to average if Y received
less, adv: diﬀerence to average if Y received more, YlessX: diﬀerence to payoﬀ for X when Y received
less, YlessX: diﬀerence when Y received more, YlessZ and YmoreZ are deﬁned equivalently, DP2 dummy
for Period 2 decisions. Reported values are the coeﬃcients and standard errors (in parentheses).
Signiﬁcance: ***p ≤ .001, **p ≤ .01, *p ≤ .05, ’p ≤ .10 .
the absolute diﬀerence in case he receives more (adv).30 As both comparison eﬀects are
signiﬁcantly negative, inequality aversion seems conﬁrmed.
However, a closer look at our data indicates that in line with our Hypothesis 9 the eﬀect
of advantageous discrimination only holds in comparison to Z’s payoﬀ. More speciﬁcally,
responders Y often reject an oﬀer in keep if they receive much more than Z - especially
if Z receives nothing - but they hardly ever reject an oﬀer where they receive much more
than X. To disentangle comparison eﬀects we ran two additional estimations. Model 2 of
table 4 only tests for comparisons with the payoﬀ of the proposer. Here the comparison
30Note that due to an identiﬁcation problem we ca not run a similar regression for Z: For Z we only
have data from keep (in XV2 and RV2). As the sum of payoﬀs is always constant in keep, only two
of the three reactions to motives are identiﬁed.
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we test for comparison eﬀects with Z only, both eﬀects turn out signiﬁcant.
Observation 10 Ceteris paribus responders Y are less likely to accept an oﬀer if they
receive less than the average payoﬀ and if they receive much more than Z.
6. Discussion
In a three party ultimatum game, a proposer can exclude a third party Z before decid-
ing how to distribute a ﬁxed amount of money, where the total available pie increases
after exclusion. With this environment, where a selﬁsh proposer has strict incentives
to exclude Z, we study especially how socially minded responders react to an inten-
tional exclusion of Z. As a proxy for social preferences, we use responder’s acceptance
thresholds as these are free of strategic considerations. We control for intentionality by
replacing the proposer decision to exclude Z with a random draw.
Our results are very mixed and diﬃcult to interpret. For instance, it is far from obvious
what eﬀect intentional exclusion of Z has on Y . The lack of signiﬁcant diﬀerences in
acceptance thresholds in XV 2 and XV 1, compared to CON, indicates that there are no
diﬀerences on the aggregate level. On the other hand, the signiﬁcantly lower thresholds
in XV 1 in comparison to RV 1 show that intentional exclusion has an eﬀect which,
however, is diﬃcult to explain. Positive direct reciprocity to the exclusion of Z appears
to be the cause. However, as explained in section 3, the act to exclude Y can only be
interpreted as kind towards Y if it is followed by a “generous” oﬀer. Accepting less out
of reciprocity contradicts the supposed kindness. We are therefore reluctant to interpret
the smaller thresholds in X ⋆⋆ treatments in comparison to R⋆⋆ as resulting from direct
reciprocity.
An alternative interpretation is that an intentional exclusion of Z signals a particular
“tough” type to what some Y react by lowering their acceptance threshold. This eﬀect
of yielding to a tough proposer happens and should be identical in XV 1 and XV 2.
However, we observe on average higher acceptance thresholds in XV 2 than in XV 1
and, furthermore, in XV 2 the distribution is bimodal. We are unable to explain either
eﬀect: For XV 2 we predicted an additional eﬀect of positive direct reciprocity to the
elimination of strategic uncertainty what should result in smaller thresholds.
One unequivocal result, however, is the absence of indirect negative reciprocity of Y
when reacting to the intentional exclusion of Z. Similarly, we do not ﬁnd increased
consideration for Z by Y in subgame keep of the V 1 treatments. But there is evidence
that Y responders actually care for Z’s payoﬀ although, to some extent this has no
consequences, as it is primarily concerned with rare zero oﬀers to Z. Zero oﬀers that
must be unlikely after the decision to keep Z. Still, it is puzzling to see that while Y
responders do care for Z’s payoﬀ, they obviously do not bother if he is excluded.
But what about Z? All we ﬁnd is a rather weak positive reaction to not being
excluded. All these results combined imply for the proposer that excluding Z has little
to no negative eﬀects for himself, whereas keeping Z on board has at most minor positive
eﬀects. This suggests that in many situations it is cheaper to exclude than hoping to
17
Jena Economic Research Papers 2011 - 053beneﬁt from not doing so. However, further research is necessary to resolve some of the
puzzles in our experimental results.
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In this section we apply Fehr and Schmidt (1999) (F&S) preferences to our experimental
game. We start with the subgame after exclude before we turn to the subgame after
keep.
A.1. Subgame after exclude
In subgame exclude, responder Y ’s F&S valuation of the acceptance of distribution
(x,y,u) with x = p − y, is deﬁned by:
V = y −
α
2
[max(p − 2y,0) + max(u − y,0)] −
β
2
[max(2y − p,0) + max(y − u,0)],
where α and β are two aversion parameters with 0 ≤ β ≤ α and β < 1. With respect to
the lowest oﬀer yt that responder Y is willing to accept, which for small u will always




2(p − 3yt + u), for yt < u;
yt − α
2(p − 2yt) −
β
2(yt − u), otherwise.
(1)









3α+2, for α < 2u






In the standard ultimatum game, however, valuation of an accepted oﬀer equals
V = y − αmax(p − 2y,0) − β max(2y − p,0)






It is easy to see that yt
CON > yt for 0 ≤ β ≤ α and β < 1.
A.2. Numeric Application of Fehr and Schmidt (1999)
In this section we apply the following widely used distribution of parameters α and β,
suggested by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) to our experiments:
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In Table 5 we list the resulting distribution of the smallest accepted oﬀer by Y . The
numeric predictions turns out to be in line with Hypothesis 7. Furthermore, Wilcoxon
rank sum tests on simulated distributions (with number of observations equivalent to
the ones in our experiments) ﬁnd signiﬁcant (p = .043) diﬀerences.










av. yt 3.8 5.2
We can also apply the distribution of aversion parameters to subgame keep. The
resulting frequencies of acceptance of each oﬀer are listed in Table 6.
Observe that we do ﬁnd consideration of Y for the payoﬀ of Z in two cases.
1. While only 10% reject an oﬀer of 4 to Y and 4 or more to Z, 40% reject an oﬀer
of 4 to Y and less than 4 to Z.
2. While all accept an oﬀer of 6 to Y and 4 or more to Z, 10% reject an oﬀer of 6
and less than 4 to Z.
Despite some strong diﬀerences in payoﬀs between X and Y we, however, do not ﬁnd
consideration by Y for X.
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Oﬀer share
x y z accept
18 0 0 30%
16 0 2 30%
14 0 4 30%
12 0 6 30%
10 0 8 30%
16 2 0 30%
14 2 2 30%
12 2 4 30%
10 2 6 30%
8 2 8 30%
14 4 0 60%
12 4 2 60%
10 4 4 90%
8 4 6 90%
6 4 8 90%
12 6 0 90%
10 6 2 90%
8 6 4 100%
6 6 6 100%
4 6 8 100%
10 8 0 100%
8 8 2 100%
6 8 4 100%
4 8 6 100%
2 8 8 100%
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This section gives the original experimental instructions of our baseline treatment XV 2
translated to English. Whenever instructions of other treatments diﬀered we indicate
this.
Instructions
Welcome! Please stop communicating with other participants, switch oﬀ your mobile
and read the following instructions carefully. If you have any question, please do not ask
loudly, raise your arm and wait for one of the supervisors to come and help you. Should
you not comply with this rule we will have to exclude you from the experiment and all
payments.
The instructions are identical for all participants. In the experiment you will remain
anonymous. This means that no participant will learn anything about your identity.
The experiment consists of two repetitions (rounds). In every round you can earn
money. How much you earn depends on your own decisions, those of others participants
and random draws. However, only one round will be paid: At the end of the experiment
a lot decides which round is relevant for payment. The money you earned in that round
will be paid to you in Euro.
There are three roles. One third of all participants decides in role X, an other third in
role Y and the remaining ones in role Z. In every round three participants each interact:
one X, one Y and one Z. In the second round participants will be mixed again such
that no one interacts in round two with someone they interacted with in the ﬁrst round.
The roles will be assigned at random at the beginning of the experiment and remain
unchanged throughout.
Sequence of a round
Basic principle
First X decides whether the round ends for Z. [R⋆⋆: ...a random draw decides whether
the round ends for Z. The probability that it ends equals [RV 1: 85%] [RV 2: 67.5%]]
...The remaining procedure depends on that decision [outcome]:
• X [R ⋆ ⋆: The random draw] decides the round does not end for Z:
If X [R ⋆ ⋆: The random draw] decides that the round does not end for Z, then
X can decide about a total amount of e18. First X determines how he intends to
divide e18 amongst himself, Y , and Z. His oﬀers y and z indicate how much he
is willing to give to Y and Z, respectively. Both, y and z, can accept any of the
following values: 0, 2, 4, 6, or 8e.
Then, both Y and Z simultaneously decide [⋆V 1: Then Y decides] whether they
accept [he accepts] this oﬀer or not. Depending on this decision payoﬀs are deter-
mined as follows:
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[⋆V 1: Y accepts oﬀer by X Y rejects oﬀer by X]
X obtains 18-y-z X obtains 0
Y obtains y Y obtains 0
Z obtains z Z obtains 0
• X [R ⋆ ⋆: The random draw] decides the round does end for Z:
If X [R⋆ ⋆: The random draw] decides that the round ends for Z, then the round
ends for Z and he obtains 1 e. For X and Y the round continues as follows:
X can decide about a total amount of 20 e. First X decides how he intends to
divide 20 eamongst himself and Y . His oﬀers y indicates how much he is willing
to give to Y . Hereby, y can accept any of the following values: 0, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, or
12e.
Then, Y decides whether he accepts this oﬀer or not. Depending on this decision
payoﬀs are determined as follows:
Y accepts oﬀer by X Y rejects oﬀer by X
X obtains 20-y X obtains 0
Y obtains y Y obtains 0
Z obtains 1 Z obtains 1
After reading these instructions we will test whether all participants have understood
them with a set of control questions on your computer screen. Please answer them as
good as possible. If you cannot answer the questions correctly we may have to exclude
you from participation. In any case you obtain 3efor answering this set of questions.
Control Questionnaire
1. Suppose X [R ⋆ ⋆: the random draw] has decided the round does not end for Z.
Participant X oﬀered y=8 to Y and z = 8 to Z.
Both, participant Y and Z rejected that oﬀer.
[⋆V 1: Participant Y rejected that oﬀer.]
What are the round incomes of X, Y , and Z?
2. [only in ⋆V 2 treatments!]
Suppose X [R ⋆ ⋆: the random draw] has decided the round does not end for Z.
Participant X oﬀered y=2 to Y and z = 8 to Z.
Participant Y accepted but Z rejected that oﬀer.
What are the round incomes of X, Y , and Z?
3. [only in ⋆V 2 treatments!]
Suppose X [R ⋆ ⋆: the random draw] has decided the round does not end for Z.
Participant X oﬀered y=8 to Y and z = 6 to Z.
Participant Y rejected but Z accepted that oﬀer.
What are the round incomes of X, Y , and Z?
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Participant X oﬀered y=6 to Y and z = 8 to Z.
Both participants Y and Z accepted that oﬀer.
[⋆V 1: Participant Y accepted that oﬀer.]
What are the round incomes of X, Y , and Z?
5. Suppose X [R ⋆ ⋆: the random draw] has decided the round does end for Z.
Participant X oﬀered y=12 to Y .
Participants Y accepted that oﬀer.
What are the round incomes of X, Y , and Z?
6. Suppose X [R ⋆ ⋆: the random draw] has decided the round does end for Z.
Participant X oﬀered y=12 to Y .
Participants Y rejected that oﬀer.
What are the round incomes of X, Y , and Z?
Detailed Procedure
The detailed procedure of the experiment deviates from the above description in the
following aspects:
After X [R ⋆ ⋆: ...the random draw ...] decides, whether the round ends for Z and
[R ⋆ ⋆: X decides] what oﬀer he makes the remaining participant(s), neither Y nor Z
learn how he has decided. Instead both (Y and Z) are asked how they [⋆V 1: ...Y is
asked how he...] would decide in each possible case.
Thus, Y has to ﬁll out two tables: In the ﬁrst he indicates for the case that the round
has ended for Z and for each possible oﬀer y (0, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12) by X whether he
accepts or rejects (see Image 1). In the second table he indicates for the case that the
round has not ended for Z and for each of the twenty-ﬁve possible combinations of oﬀers
(y, z) by X to Y and Z, whether he accepts or rejects (see Image 2).
Z only needs to ﬁll out one table that resembles the second for participant Y . He
also indicates for the case that the round has not ended for him and for each of the
twenty-ﬁve possible combinations of oﬀers (y, z) by X to Y and Z, whether he accepts
or rejects (see Image 3). [Paragraph deleted in ⋆V 1: treatments]
After all participants of one group made their decisions everyone is informed about
the relevant decisions and round incomes are calculated.
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